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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
Judge Murphy of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
resolved defendant's post-divorce decree motion to compel release of tax 
exemptions by sustaining plaintiffs objection to Commissioner Evans' 
Recommendation that the motion be granted. The Utah Court of Appeals 
has appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's order under Section 
78-2a-3(I), Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue before this court on appeal may be simply stated: Did 
the trial court err in construing the Supplemental Decree of Divorce to 
require defendant to pay the difference in tax liability incurred solely as a 
result of income of plaintiff s present husband in order to exercise his right 
to acquire the tax exemptions for the parties' children? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Consideration of this issue does not require that any deference be 
given to the trial court's ruling. It requires legal interpretation of the 
provisions of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce and review of the trial 
court's legal conclusions de novo for correctness. Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1039-1040 (Utah 1991). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDING. 
This appeal is from a final order of the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, denying defendant's post-divorce decree 
motion to compel plaintiff to refund payment demanded for release of tax 
exemptions. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Plaintiff and defendant stipulated to a decree of divorce entered in 
January of 1993. [R. 333-344]. The decree awarded plaintiff child support 
in the sum of One Thousand, Three Hundred, Eighty-seven and 00/100 
dollars ($1,387.00) per month, based solely upon income earned by 
defendant. [R. 334]. Plaintiff was unemployed at the time the decree was 
entered and remains, by choice, unemployed. She does not contribute 
financially to the support of the parties' four minor daughters, the youngest 
of which is 10 years of age. 
Paragraph 16 of the Supplemental decree of Divorce awards 
defendant the right to acquire the tax exemptions for his four daughters "by 
paying to plaintiff any difference in her tax liability resulting from defendant 
purchasing the right to claim said tax exemptions." [R. 341-342]. 
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For the tax year 1992, plaintiff had no tax liability, with or without the 
exemptions. She refused to comply with the decree and ultimately signed 
over the exemptions on the morning of a hearing scheduled on defendant's 
motion to compel her to do so. 
In February of 1993, plaintiff remarried. For the tax year 1993, 
plaintiff again refused to release the exemptions. After defendant filed a 
motion to compel, she demanded and received from defendant the sum of 
Three Thousand forty-four and 00/100 dollars ($3,044.00), representing the 
difference in tax liability of her new husband, based solely upon his income. 
[R. 360-361 ]. Defendant advised plaintiff that he was paying under protest 
in order to preserve his right to the exemptions and would move the court for 
an order refunding the money. [R. 360-361]. 
On April 13,1994, defendant filed the motion which is the subject of 
this appeal, to compel plaintiff to refund the payment demanded for release 
of the tax exemptions. [R. 363] 
After thorough consideration, the Court Commissioner, in a carefully 
reasoned memorandum decision, granted the motion to compel repayment, 
stating: 
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9. Since the Decree of Divorce was 
entered in this matter the Child Support 
Guidelines with respect to the award of the 
children as dependents for tax purposes has been 
amended and provides some further direction to 
the court. Section 78-45-7.21(2) provides, "In 
awarding the exemption, the court or 
administrative agency shall consider: (a) as the 
primary factor, the relative contribution of each 
parent to the cost of raising the child; and (b) 
among other factors, the relative tax benefit to 
each parent." (Emphasis added by 
commissioner). 
The appropriate interpretation of the 
disputed language as contained in the Decree of 
Divorce is as the defendant argues: that only the 
tax liability of these parents is to be considered in 
determining the amount, if any, defendant is to 
reimburse plaintiff for the right to claim the 
children as his dependents. Only if plaintiffs 
present husband's income is included in 
determining defendant's child support obligation 
would it be fair and consistent with the intent of 
the guidelines to allow the court to consider 
plaintiffs husband's tax liability in the award of 
the children as dependents for tax purposes. 
See Minute Entry of August 16, 1994, a copy of which attached as 
Addendum Exhibit 1. 
Plaintiff objected to the commissioner's ruling and the Trial Judge 
overruled the commissioner, denying defendant's motion to compel. A copy 
of the order and a transcript of his ruling are attached to the Addendum as 
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Exhibits 2 and 3 respectively. 
For the tax year 1994, plaintiff demanded from defendant the sum of 
Two Thousand, Three Hundred, Forty-five and 71/100 Dollars ($2,345.71) 
for the release of the exemptions, a sum based on tax liability resulting 
completely from income of her present husband. Defendant did not 
purchase the exemptions and incurred additional tax liability of One 
Thousand, Nine Hundred, Ninety-nine and 00/100 Dollars ($1,999.00) as a 
result of being denied his right to claim the tax exemptions. 
By this appeal defendant and appellant seeks (1) reversal of the denial 
of his motion to compel reimbursement, (2) recovery of the total sum of Five 
Thousand, Forty-three and 00/100 Dollars ($5,043.00), paid to plaintiff and 
incurred by defendant in additional tax liability together with interest at 
applicable legal rates and, (3) an order consistent with the Commissioner's 
Ruling of August 16, 1994, that to purchase the exemptions he be required 
to pay plaintiff only the tax liability resulting from plaintiff's income, not the 
income of her current husband. In the event this appeal is resolved after 
April 15,1996, defendant will also seek recovery for being denied his right 
to claim the exemptions for the 1995 tax year. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's right to purchase the tax exemptions for the parties' 
minor children under paragraph 16 of the decree of divorce requires only 
that he pay any difference in plaintiffs tax liability which would result from 
her losing the exemptions. The plain meaning of this provision of the decree 
requires that the calculation of the difference in tax liability be based solely 
upon income earned by plaintiff. Plaintiffs demand and requirement that 
defendant pay a difference in tax liability resulting solely from income of her 
present husband is completely inconsistent with the intent of the parties as 
it is expressed in the plain language of the decree. 
The appropriate interpretation of paragraph 16 of the decree is that 
only the tax liability of the parties to the divorce decree is to be considered 
in determining the amount, if any defendant must pay for the right to claim 
the children as his dependents. The income of plaintiffs present husband is 
completely irrelevant. Plaintiff earns no income and the income of her 
present husband has not been considered in determining defendant's child 
support obligation, which is based solely upon defendant's income. It would 
be patently unfair and inconsistent with both the intent of the parties as 
expressed in the decree and the Utah child support guidelines to consider the 
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tax liability of plaintiffs present husband in calculating what defendant must 
pay in order to purchase the exemptions. 
The trial court's concern that a calculation which does not consider 
the income of plaintiffs present husband would be "hypothetical" 
completely misses the point. Any time a non-custodial parent is awarded a 
right to purchase exemptions based upon the custodial parent's difference 
in tax liability, there must, by definition, be a calculation involving 
potentially hypothetical tax calculations which may never actually be 
incorporated into a return. 
The court's order denying defendant's motion to compel 
reimbursement should be reversed and plaintiff should required to return 
with interest all sums defendant previously paid and incurred in additional 
tax liability as a result of calculations based upon tax liability attributable 
to income of plaintiff s present husband. 
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ARGUMENT 
IN ORDER FOR DEFENDANT TO 
ACQUIRE THE TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR 
HIS CHILDREN, THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE REQUIRES ONLY THAT HE 
PAY THE DIFFERENCE IN THE SOLE 
TAX LIABILITY OF PLAINTIFF, NOT 
THE TAX LIABILITY OF HER PRESENT 
HUSBAND 
Paragraph 16 of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce states: 
16. The defendant is awarded the right to 
purchase the tax exemptions for the parties' 
minor children from plaintiff. Defendant may 
exercise this right by paying to plaintiff any 
difference in her tax liability resulting from 
defendant purchasing the right to claim said tax 
exemptions. 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 16, P. 9. [R. 341-342]. There 
is no dispute that plaintiff is unemployed by choice and that she does not 
contribute financially to the parties' children. Plaintiff nonetheless contends 
that this provision requires defendant to pay to her a difference in tax 
liability based solely on income of her present husband in order to acquire 
the exemptions. Defendant maintains that he need only pay any difference 
in her tax liability, exclusive of the tax liability of her present husband. 
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Courts have uniformly held that "[t]he meaning of a settlement 
agreement incorporated into a divorce decree should be determined 
according to the usual rules governing the construction of contracts. Kruse 
vTodd. 389 S.E.2d 488,491 (Ga. 1990). See also, Sweeney v. Sweeney. 
519 A.2d 1237 (Conn. App. 1987), Sutton v. Sutton. 771 S.W.2d 791 (Ark. 
App. 1989). The law of contracts, in turn, dictates that such agreements 
must be interpreted in a manner that is compatible with the clear intent of the 
parties as manifested by the written terms of the agreement. National 
Western Life Tns. Co. V. Schmek. 749 P.2d 974, 976 (Colo. App. 1987). 
As this issue appears to be one of first impression for the Utah Appellate 
Courts, there are no Utah cases which may be considered determinative. In 
Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989), this court ruled on a 
related issue, holding that state courts have authority to direct a custodial 
parent to release tax exemptions to a noncustodial parent, in cases such as 
this where " . . . the noncustodial parent has the higher income and provides 
the majority of support. . .." Id. at 239. The same policy considerations 
apply to this case. 
The clear intent of the parties as manifested by the written terms of 
paragraph 16 is that defendant is required to pay to plaintiff only for a 
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difference in "her" tax liability. It cannot reasonably be interpreted to 
require defendant to pay a difference in tax liability of plaintiff s present 
husband, incurred solely as a result of his income. 
The court commissioner, after a lengthy oral argument and careful 
consideration under advisement, recommended in his minute entry of August 
16, 1994, that the trial court grant defendant's motion to compel 
reimbursement of $3,044.49, paid by defendant under protest to plaintiff for 
the release of tax exemptions. Paragraph 9 of the Commissioner's findings 
on page 4 of the Minute Entry states: 
Since the Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter 
the Child Support Guidelines with respect to the award of the 
children as dependents for tax purposes has been amended and 
provides some further direction to the court. Section 78-45-
7.21(2) provides, "In awarding the exemption, the court or 
administrative agency shall consider: (A) as the primary 
factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of 
raising the child: and (b) among other factors, the relative tax 
benefit to each parent. (Emphasis added by commissioner) 
The appropriate interpretation of the disputed language 
as contained in the decree is as the defendant argues: that only 
the tax liability of these parents is to be considered in 
determining the amount, if any, defendant is to reimburse 
plaintiff for the right to claim the children as dependents. Only 
if plaintiffs present husband's income is included in 
determining defendant's child support obligation would it be 
fair and consistent with the intent of the guidelines to allow the 
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court to consider plaintiff husband's tax liability in the award 
of the children as dependents for tax purposes. 
Minute Entry, Page 4. This ruling by the commissioner is sound in its 
reasoning and interpretation of Utah law and the decree of divorce. It is also 
supported by the same policy considerations adopted by this court in Motes. 
above, favoring the allocation of tax exemptions to the parent of the children 
who provides the greater support and for whom the tax benefit would be 
greater. 
The commissioner did not misinterpret the law or the decree as 
plaintiff argued in her objection to his ruling. Her objection and the reasons 
stated therein are groundless. [R. 406-407]. There is nothing in the 
commissioner's ruling that "ignores the fact that plaintiff files a joint return." 
[R. 407]. Nor does it "require the plaintiff to file a married/single return ." 
[R. 407]. The plaintiff need only obtain a tax form and calculate what her 
tax would have been based upon her individual income for the year, just as 
the decree requires her to do in any event. The procedure is very simple; in 
fact, while plaintiff remains unemployed, the procedure is unnecessary. 
Once she signs the exemptions over to defendant as required by the decree, 
she is free to file any appropriate tax return including a joint return with her 
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present husband. Plaintiffs claim that "[t]he only way to calculate the tax 
effect of losing exemptions is to calculate the loss of the exemptions in the 
context of the joint return" is simply false. 
Plaintiff is unemployed by choice. She earns no income and therefore 
has no tax liability. She does not contribute to the cost of raising the parties5 
four minor children. She receives almost $17,000.00 per year, completely 
tax free from defendant, for whom said income is taxable and not subject to 
any claim for deduction. The district court's ruling that defendant must pay 
the difference in her husband's tax liability essentially increases her child 
support to $20,000.00 per year tax free. Under the plain meaning of the 
decree and simple principles of equity and fairness, she should not be 
entitled to additional compensation for the exemptions on the children by 
virtue of the fact that she has married someone who earns in excess of 
$75,000.00 per year and wants the exemptions so that he may save over 
$3,000 in state and federal taxes. Requiring defendant to pay a difference 
in tax liability resulting solely from the income of plaintiff s present husband 
renders defendant's right to purchase the exemptions meaningless and has 
the effect of erasing it completely from the decree, a result which contradicts 
the clear intent of the parties. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plain language of the decree and principles of fairness and equity 
dictate that defendant not be required to pay a difference in tax liability 
resulting solely from income of plaintiffs present husband in order to 
purchase the tax exemptions for his children. For the reasons stated above 
defendant respectfully requests that this court: (1) reverse the trial court's 
denial of his motion to compel reimbursement, (2) Order plaintiff to pay to 
defendant the total sum of Five Thousand, forty-three and 00/100 Dollars 
($5,043.00), paid to plaintiff and incurred by defendant in additional tax 
liability, together with interest at applicable legal rates and, (3) Enter an 
order consistent with the Commissioner's Ruling of August 16, 1994, that 
to purchase the exemptions he be required to pay plaintiff only the tax 
liability resulting from plaintiffs income, not the income of her present 
husband. In addition, if this appeal is ruled upon after April 15, 1996, 
defendant requests that he be awarded an additional sum representing the 
amount paid to plaintiff or incurred in additional tax liability as a result of 
not being able to claim the exemptions. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF APPELLANT ROGER R. FAIRBANKS was Mailed, postage prepaid, 
this of December, 1995, to the following: 
Frederick N. Green 
GREEN & BERRY 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
%t*.U~~ 
Defefrdant and Appellant 
Attorney, Pro se 
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DATED this of December, 1995. 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
Defendant and Appellant 
Attorney, Pro se 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Minute Entry of Court Commissioner Dated August 16, 1994. [R. 
399-405]. 
2. Order of Trial Court Dated May 2, 1995. [R.599-600]. 
3. Transcript of hearing on October 24, 1994. [R. 618-622]. 
4. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.21. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Jill Fairbanks, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : 
: CASE NO: 914902005 DA 
vs. : 
: COMMISSIONER: 
Roger R. Fairbanks, : Michael S. Evans 
Defendant. : 
The Commissioner having received proffers of testimony and argument from Counsel, 
having taken the parties' respective requests under advisement to allow a review of the pleadings 
on file and the exhibits submitted at hearing to allow a consideration of the parties respective 
arguments, having reviewed the pleadings on file herein now 
HNDS: 
1. Each party alleges the other party has engaged in inappropriate behavior during 
the times that the children were exchanged for visitation and, given the ages of the children, an 
order of "curb side" visitation appears to be in the children's best interests. 
2. The parties dispute whether defendant has substantially complied with the court's 
order of visitation in accordance with the standard schedule, which identifies a friday 6:00 p.m. 
starting date for visitation periods. It appears to be in the children's best interests that defendant 
arrive no later than 7:00 p.m. on the date set for visitation and, in the event he should fail to 
do so, that plaintiff be free to make other arrangements for the children. 
FAIRBANKS V. FAIRBANKS PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
3. The Decree of Divorce specifically provides, in paragraph 4, defendant's 
obligation to obtain life insurance, which life insurance defendant has failed to obtain simply 
alleging that he cannot afford to do so. 
4. It appears that defendant was provided with plaintiffs request for reimbursement 
regarding the children's medical bills, if not early then by way of pleadings submitted in support 
of plaintiff s present morion, and it is reasonable that judgment be entered against defendant in 
the amount of attomey^s-feo6 as prayed. 
5. It does not appear as though defendant has been delinquent in the payments of 
child support in an amount equal to support owing for a thirty day period and within the 
meaning of the statute and it is inappropriate to find such a delinquency has occurred and to 
enter an order to withhold and deliver child support. 
6. The parties disagree with the interpretation of the Decree of Divorce as it relates 
to the award of attorney's fees to plaintiff. The Decree of Divorce in paragraph 15 orders 
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of $3,000.00 as a contribution to plaintiffs attorney's fees 
and sets forth a payment schedule. The final sentence of paragraph 15, which is the disputed 
language provides, wIn the event the defendant becomes more than thirty days delinquent in 
payment of said obligation for attorney's fees and costs, then plaintiff shall be entitled to obtain 
a judgment against defendant for the unpaid balance owing . . .M. Plaintiff argues that any 
thirty day delinquency in any of the payments pursuant to schedule allows her to seek a 
judgment for any unpaid balance of the original $3,000.00 award, while defendant argues that 
only those payments which were due according to the schedule of payments may be reduced to 
FAIRBANKS V. FAIRBANKS PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
judgment. The Commissioner finds that the Decree is appropriately interpreted to require that 
any unpaid balance owing of the $3,000.00 attorney's fees awarded at the time of a thirty day 
delinquency, which has in fact occurred, is the appropriate interpretation of the Decree. 
7. The parties also dispute the language of paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce 
regarding the right to claim the parties' minor children as dependents for tax purposes. 
Paragraph 16 provides, in pertinent part, "The defendant is awarded the right to purchase the 
tax exemptions for the parties1 minor children from plaintiff. Defendant may exercise this right 
by paying to plaintiff any difference in her tax liability resulting from defendant purchasing the 
right to claim said tax exemptions." 
The parties' dispute in this regard stems from plaintiffs remarriage and her argument 
that, although she remains substantially unemployed and generating minimal income for herself, 
that the tax liability resulting from her present husband's income is her shared liability and that 
only by defendant repaying all of the additional tax liability resulting from plaintiff and her 
present husband not claiming the children as their dependents are the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce fulfilled. Defendant argues, conversely, that it is only any tax liability plaintiff in her 
own name and as a result of her own earnings that he is required to reimburse. 
8. The child support award entered in this matter was entered pursuant to Utah's 
Child Support Guidelines attributing no income to plaintiff and requiring that defendant pay one 
hundred percent of the guideline amount of support. 
FAIRBANKS V. FAIRBANKS PAGE FOUR MINUTE ENTRY 
9. Since the Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter the Child Support 
Guidelines with respect to the award of the children as dependents for tax purposes has been 
amended and provides some further direction to the court. Section 78-45-7.21(2) provides, "In 
awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall consider: (a) as the primary 
factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising the child; and (b) among 
other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent." (emphasis added) 
The appropriate interpretation of the disputed language as contained in the Decree of 
Divorce is as the defendant argues: that only the tax liability of these parents is to be considered 
in determining the amount, if any, defendant is to reimburse plaintiff for the right to claim the 
children as his dependents. Only if plaintiffs present husband's income is included in 
determining defendant's child support obligation would it be fair and consistent with the intent 
of the guidelines to allow the court to consider plaintiffs husband's tax liability in the award of 
the children as dependent's for tax purposes. 
RECOMMENDS: 
1. The parties be restrained from having any contact with one another during times 
the children are exchanged for periods of visitation and that defendant arrive at plaintiffs home 
at the appointed time, in no event later than 7:00 p.m. when the visitation is to commence at 
6:00 p.m., and remain in his vehicle while plaintiff sends the children out, with the process to 
be repeated at the end of any visitation period. 
FAIRBANKS V. FAIRBANKS PAGE FIVE MINUTE ENTRY 
2. In the event defendant arrives more than one hour past the scheduled time for 
visitation, plaintiff be free to make other arrangements for the children. 
3. The issue of defendant's contempt for failure to obtain life insurance as ordered 
in the Decree of Divorce be certified for further hearing before the assigned judge. Defendant 
may purge himself of any finding of contempt in this regard by his forthwith obtaining life 
insurance consistent with the Decree of Divorce. 
4. Plaintiff be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of $755.00 
representing one half of the children's uninsured medical expense. The issue of defendant's 
contempt in this regard be reserved pending his future performance. 
5. Defendant be admonished to abide by the terms of the Decree of Divorce in 
promptly make all payments of child support on the date due. The issue of defendant's contempt 
in this regard should be reserved pending his future performance. 
6. Plaintiff be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of $3,000.00, together 
with judgment rate of interest, representing attorney's fees due, owing but unpaid pursuant to 
the Decree of Divorce. 
7. Defendant's Motion to Compel Reimbursement of sums paid to plaintiff 
representing reimbursement to plaintiff for her tax liability resulting from not claiming the 
parties' minor children as her dependents for tax purposes be granted and plaintiff return, 
forthwith, that portion of the. sums defendant previously paid which represent additional tax 
liability attributable to plaintiffs present husband. In the event plaintiff herself incurred any 
additional tax liability on her earnings as a result of not claiming the children as her 
FAIR3ANKS V. FAIRBANKS PAGE SIX MINUTE ENTRY 
dependents for tax purposes, said sum should not be repaid to defendant. 
8. Each party bear their own attorney's fees and costs for this hearing. 
9. Plaintiffs Counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this recommendation. 
Dated this 1 y day of August, 1994. 
l\t*A\i\tol A J AQJA 
Michael S. Evans 
District Court Commissioner 
FAIRBANKS V. FAIRBANKS PAGE SEVEN MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following this I (jP day of August, 1994. 
Frederick N. Green 
GREEN & BERRY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Roger R. Fairbanks 
Defendant 
594 West Murray Boulevard, Apt. 1-K 
Murray, UT 84123 
<Q#M 
EXHIBIT 2 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (124 0) 
SUSAN C. BRADFORD (5377) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JILL FAIRBANKS, 
O R D E R 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Civil No. 914902005DA 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
the 24th day of October, 1994, before the Honorable Judge Michael 
R. Murphy, Presiding, based upon the Plaintiff's Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation, the Plaintiff appearing in person 
and through her attorney of record, and the Defendant appearing 
in person and as his own attorney, the matter having been 
submitted to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 and Rule 6-401 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration, and the Court having granted 
oral argument and considered the evidence and argument of the 
parties, and good cause otherwise appearing, it is, hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff's objection to the Commissioner's 
recommendation is, and is hereby, sustained. 
2. That the Defendant's Motion to Compel is denied. 
3. That in all other respects the Commissioner's 
recommendation is affirmed insofar as no other portions rhereof 
have been objected to. 
4. That the basis for this Order was articulated by the 
Court at the time of the ruling. The Defendant shall, as soon as 
possible, obtain a transcript of the ruling at the Defendant's 
expense which shall be made a part of this record and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
DATED THIS 2*.ft day of ftylA/)^ , 1995. 2 BY THE COURT 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to Form: 
J— ^iAJ^ 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, ESQ. 
Defendant Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Audree D. Askee, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY, 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein, that she served the attached 
ORDER upon the following parties by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq. 
Defendant Pro Se 
261 East 300 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
M day of October, 2995. 
.1 KX^J K-JL n .ZLk. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
1995. 
* day of October, __J 
Yjcfo-Vjfi /]. 
My Commission Expires: 
F- — "!^T — — — •— — — — *-—» •*• — «* 
: S**ZLS$*K Notary Pubfc ' 
'• '* \^^<§K PAT7=:CJ.4 i. "L%r I 
<5K\A 6615 5-^: * 3 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JILL FAIRBANKS 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS, 
DEFENDANT. 
CASE NO. 914902005 
JUDGE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
HEARING OF OCTOBER 24, 1994 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
FREDERICK N. GREEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE #622 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
PRO SE 
REPORTED BY: GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CSR 
OCTOBER 24. 1994 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
P R O C E E D I N G S . 
3I (EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS CONTAINING 
4 I COURT'S RULING.) 
5 
6 1 THE COURT: I'M PREPARED TO RULE ON THIS 
7 AT THIS TIME. 
8 A COUPLE OF ITEMS,JUST AS BACKGROUND. THE 
9 CHILD SUPPORT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE IS PREMISED ON 
10 ON THE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES AS THEY WERE 
11 PRE-JULY, 1994. AS OF JULY 1994, THERE WAS A CHANGE 
12 IN THE GUIDELINE AMOUNTS,-IN PART AS A RESULT OF 
13 TAKING OUT SOME — FOR WANT OF A BETTER TERM — 
14 DISTORTION IN THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT TO BE 
15 AWARDED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ATTRIBUTING OR 
16 ASSUMING THAT THE EXEMPTIONS WOULD GO TO THE 
17 CUSTODIAL PARENT. 
18 THAT WAS COMPLETELY TAKEN OUT OF ANY 
19 CALCULATION OF THE GUIDELINES, AND WAS PUT IN AS A 
20 SEPARATE PROVISION REQUIRING THE COURT IN EACH CASE 
21 TO INDEPENDENTLY ALLOCATE THE EXEMPTIONS. 
22 SO AS IT STOOD BEFORE JULY OF 94, THE 
23 GUIDELINES THAT WERE APPLICABLE WERE IN FACT REDUCED 
24 FOR THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE EXEMPTION GOES TO THE 
25 CUSTODIAL PARENT. 
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE FILE, AND I GUESS 
THIS IS ALMOST LIKE NEGATIVE JUDICIAL NOTICE, BUT I 
3 I DO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IN 
4 I THE FILE TO INDICATE THAT THERE WAS A ATTRIBUTION OR 
5 ASSUMED INCOME TO THE PLAINTIFF. BUT IF THAT WAS 
6 ANY PART OF THE COMMISSIONER'S RULING, I DON'T 
7 UNDERSTAND THE NEXUS AND IT DOESN'T SEEM TO ME TO BE 
8 A LOGICAL PREMISE TO HIS RULING. 
9 WHAT APPEARS TO BE IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE 
10 IS -- WELL, LET ME ELIMINATE THIS FIRST. THE NON-
11 PARTIES, AND THAT IS MS. EYRING'S NEW SPOUSE'S 
12 INCOME, AS MR. FAIRBANS SUGGESTS, SHOULD NOT BE 
13 CONSIDERED. 
14 TO ME THAT MISS MISSES THE POINT. THE 
15 POINT IS THE ARTICULATION IN THE DECREE, OR WHAT IS 
16 NOW THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE. AND THAT PREMISES THE 
17 DETERMINATION OF THE COST OF PURCHASING THE 
18 EXEMPTION BASED ON WHAT WAS REFERENCED AS "HER", 
19 MEANING THE PLAINTIFF'S TAX LIABILITY. 
20 WELL, ONCE SHE BECOMES REMARRIED, THEN SHE 
21 HAS THE ALTERNATIVE OF FILING JOINTLY OR SEPARATELY. 
22 HER TAX LIABILITY IS BASED ON THE RETURN THAT SHE 
23 DOES IN FACT FILE. THE CHOICE HERE WAS TO FILE 
24 JOINTLY. AND SHE IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE 
25 FOR THE TAX LIABILITY RESULTING FROM THAT RETURN. 
1 TO RESOLVE THIS CASE ON THE BASIS OF 
2 HYPOTHETICAL CALCULATIONS, AND THAT IS, A 
3 CALCULATION OF TAX LIABILITY IF SHE WERE MARRIED 
4 I FILING SEPARATEL/, OR THE TAX LIABILITY OF HER BEING 
5 SINGLE AND FILING AS HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IS EXACTLY 
6 THAT, IS A HYPOTHETICAL. 
7 THESE ARE REAL MATTERS, AND THEY SHOULD BE 
8 DETERMINED IN THE REAL CONTEXT, AND THAT CONTEXT IS 
9 MARRIED FILING JOINTLY. AND ONLY IN THAT CONTEXT DO 
10 WE APPROPRIATELY ANALYSE THE EXPRESSION, "HER TAX 
11 LIABILITY," AS THAT EXPRESSION IS USED IN THE 
12 DECREE. 
13 FOR THAT REASON THAT PORTION OF THE 
14 COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION IS OVERRULED. AND 
15 YOU'RE TO PREPARE AN ORDER UNDER RULE 4-504 TO THAT 
16 EFFECT, MR. GREEN. 
17 MR. GREEN: I WILL, YOUR HONOR. 
18 I (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
19 
20 
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EXHIBIT 4 
78-45-7.21. Award of tax exemption for dependent chil-
dren. 
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to 
claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax 
purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or 
administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a 
case-by-case basis. 
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall 
consider: 
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the 
cost of raising the child; and 
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may 
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not 
current in his child support obligation, in which case the court or administra-
tive agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent. 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will 
result in a tax benefit to that parent. 
History: C.1953,78-45-7.21, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 118,5 23 
1994, ch. 118, § 22. makes the act effective on July 1,1994. 
